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Causal composition allows people to generate new causal relations by combining existing
causal knowledge. We introduce a new computational model of such reasoning, the force
theory, which holds that people compose causal relations by simulating the processes
that join forces in the world, and compare this theory with the mental model theory
(Khemlani et al., 2014) and the causal model theory (Sloman et al., 2009), which explain
causal composition on the basis of mental models and structural equations, respectively.
In one experiment, the force theory was uniquely able to account for people’s ability
to compose causal relationships from complex animations of real-world events. In three
additional experiments, the force theory did as well as or better than the other two theories
in explaining the causal compositions people generated from linguistically presented
causal relations. Implications for causal learning and the hierarchical structure of causal
knowledge are discussed.
Keywords: causal reasoning, mental simulation, causal models, causal learning, knowledge structures, lexical
semantics
CAUSAL REASONING WITH FORCES
Causal relations can be generated by forming links between
non-adjacent entities in a causal chain. The phenomenon is exem-
plified in ordinary causal transitive reasoning. When told, for
example, that A causes B and that B causes C, people can infer
that A causes C, or when told, for instance, that Sanding causes
dust and Dust causes sneezing, they conclude that Sanding causes
sneezing. In transitive reasoning, such as this, the two component
relations (e.g., the two CAUSE relations) are the same (Egenhofer,
1994). Interestingly, the process of deriving new causal relations
can also occur in chains in which the component relations dif-
fer, that is, in chains involving different kinds of causal relations,
including relations such as causing, allowing, and preventing. For
example, when told that A causes B and that B prevents C, people
may infer that A prevents C (Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird, 2001;
Barbey andWolff, 2006, 2007; Sloman et al., 2009; Khemlani et al.,
2014), or more concretely, when told Sanding causes dust, Dust
prevents adhesion, we can infer that Sanding prevents adhesion.
When causal relations are formed from different kinds of causal
relations, the process is not simple transitive reasoning: instead,
the reasoning involves a process known as relation composition.
More formally, given the relations a Ri b and b Rj c, relation
composition is the process that determines the relation (Rk) that
holds between a and c (Ulam, 1990; Egenhofer, 1994). The pro-
cess is often symbolized by the relation composition symbol, a
small circle “◦,” written between the names of the relations being
composed.
The process of relation composition can be depicted graphi-
cally, as shown in Figure 1 (e.g., Rodríguez et al., 2002). In the
top panel of Figure 1, the composition of the relation between a
and b and the relation between b and c, is Cause ◦ Prevent. In the
bottom panel of Figure 1, the symbols in the top graph are fleshed
out in an actual example; in this case, the relation composition of
CAUSE and PREVENT is PREVENT. Relation composition can
occur across a range of relation types. For example, the process
applies to relations of equality and inequality: if a is equal to
b and b is greater than c, then a must be greater than c (Hein,
2002); temporal relations: if a occurs during b, and b occurs after
c, then a occurs after c as well (Allen, 1984; Van Beek, 1989;
Hajnicz, 1996; Rodríguez et al., 2002); and spatial relations: if a
is inside of b and b is outside of c, then a must be outside of c
(Egenhofer, 1994; Rodríguez and Egenhofer, 2000; Skiadopoulos
and Koubarakis, 2004).
Recently, researchers have begun to examine relation compo-
sition with respect to causation (Sloman et al., 2009; Khemlani
et al., 2014), a kind of relation composition that will be referred
to as causal composition. According to the mental model the-
ory (Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird, 2001; Khemlani et al., 2014),
causal composition involves operations on relations that spec-
ify possible logical entailments, whereas, according to the causal
model theory, causal composition involves operations on rela-
tions that imply families of dependencies (sometimes statistical).
According to both of these theories, the process of causal com-
position occurs over units of cognition that bear little or no
resemblance to entities in the outside world, just as the word
“tree” bears no resemblance to what it refers to in the actual world.
The current state of the literature might be interpreted as indicat-
ing that generative processes, such as causal composition, require
units of cognition that are inherently abstract in nature and quite
different from the codes used in the perception of causal relations.
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FIGURE 1 | The top panel shows how relation composition can be
realized in a directed graph as a relation between non-adjoining
elements in a chain. The bottom panel replaces the symbols in the top
graph with a real world example.
In this paper, however, we describe a new theory of causal com-
position, the force theory, which suggests that the underlying units
need not be so abstract. In particular, according to the force the-
ory, relation composition occurs over iconic perceptual codes.
The codes are iconic in the sense that they are internally organized
in a manner that parallels the structure of the quantities they refer
to the physical world. The codes parallel the structure of the phys-
ical world just as a road map reflects the spatial organization of
the streets and highways in the world. The codes are perceptual
in the sense that they are internally organized in a manner that
mirrors the internal organization of the mental representations
produced from directly perceiving a causal event. The force theory
assumes mental representations like those proposed in Kosslyn’s
(1980) quasi-pictorial theory and Shepard and Chipman’s (1970)
theory of second-order isomorphisms. Of central interest in this
paper will be whether a theory of causal composition based on
iconic perceptual codes is able to account for the phenomenon of
causal composition as well as, or even better than, theories based
on abstract codes. To the extent that this is possible, it would
imply that causal reasoning may be based on representations that
are perceptual in nature, without the need for abstract mental
codes (Barsalou, 1999; Wolff, 2007; Battaglia et al., 2013; Wolff
and Shepard, 2013).
ABSTRACT CODE THEORIES OF CAUSAL COMPOSITION
MENTAL MODEL THEORY
According to the mental model theory (Khemlani et al., 2014),
causal relations and their composition can be explained in terms
of logical relations. As with the other theories to be discussed, the
mental model theory assumes three major kinds of causal rela-
tions: CAUSE, ALLOW, and PREVENT. The theory holds that
these three kinds of causal relations are associated with differ-
ent combinations of possible co-occurrences. The sets of possible
co-occurrences associated with CAUSE, ALLOW, and PREVENT
are shown in the first column of Table 1. For example, a CAUSE
Table 1 | Possible co-occurrences associated with the concepts
CAUSE, ALLOW, PREVENT, and various derivatives though negation.
Basic Antecedent Consequent
relation negated negated
CAUSE a b ¬A_CAUSE ¬a b CAUSE¬B a ¬b
¬a b a b ¬a ¬b
¬a ¬b a ¬b ¬a b
ALLOW a b ¬A_ALLOW ¬a b ALLOW¬B a ¬b
a ¬b ¬a ¬b a b
¬a ¬b a ¬b ¬a b
PREVENT a ¬b ¬A_PREVENT ¬a ¬b PREVENT¬B a b
¬a b a b ¬a ¬b
¬a ¬b a ¬b ¬a b
¬A, Lack of antecedent, ¬B, Lack of consequent.
relation is associated with a set of co-occurrences in which A
is present and B is present, A is absent and B is present, and
A is absent and B is absent. Critically, the theory holds that a
CAUSE relation is not associated with a co-occurrence in which
A is present and B is absent. The theory implies, then, that in a
CAUSE relation the presence of A is sufficient for the occurrence
of B, but not necessary. ALLOW relations, on the hand, are asso-
ciated with co-occurrences in which A is present and B is present,
A is present and B is absent, and A is absent and B is absent; they
are not associated with co-occurrences in which A is absent and
B is present. The theory implies, then, that in an ALLOW rela-
tion, the presence of A is necessary for the occurrence of B, but
not sufficient. Finally, PREVENT relations are associated with co-
occurrences patterns in which A is present and B is absent, A is
absent and B is present, and A is absent and B is absent, but not
a co-occurrence pattern in which A is present and B is present.
Negation is handled using the negation operator, ¬. Negating the
antecedent or consequent of a causal relation involves flipping the
states of affairs of the antecedents and consequents (respectively)
in all of the possible co-occurrences.
An interesting consequence of the model theory is that it
implies certain correspondence relationships between different
types of causal expressions. For example, as shown in Table 1,
the theory predicts that A prevents B and A causes ¬B should be
paraphrases of each other because they share the same set of co-
occurrences and hence the same truth conditions. In support of
this particular correspondence, the claim pain prevents sleep can
be fairly accurately paraphrased as pain causes lack of sleep (Wolff
et al., 2010). As we will see, correspondences between negated
and non-negated expressions of causation play an important role
in the interpretation of the findings in several experiments: for
example, if a theory predicts that the overall relation for a causal
chain is PREVENT, and people respond with CAUSE¬B, their
response is not necessarily inconsistent with the theory’s pre-
diction since the two expressions are assumed to have the same
meaning.
The mental model theory provides an account of the composi-
tion of various types of causal relations. In discussing this and the
following theories, we will use terminology typical of syllogistic
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reasoning. That is, we will refer to the relations in the causal chain
as “premises” and their composition, as a “conclusion.”
Table 2 outlines a simplified version of the steps involved in
deriving a conclusion in the mental model theory (see Khemlani
et al., 2014 for details). The first step is to list the possible co-
occurrences associated with each causal relation, or premise. For
example, in Table 2, the co-occurrences associated with a causes
b and b prevents c are listed. The next main step is to conjoin
the sets of possible co-occurrences with respect to their shared
common argument. In Table 2, the shared common argument
is b. Once the sets are conjoined, the common argument (i.e., b)
can be dropped since the goal of the procedure is to identify the
relationship between the unconnected arguments (i.e., a and c).
Any resulting redundancies are dropped as well (e.g., dropping
the b term results in two a c co-occurrences, so one is deleted).
Finally, the kind of relation entailed by the conjoining of the co-
occurrences can be interpreted. In Table 2, the co-occurrences
(a c), (a c), (a c) make up the set of co-occurrences associated
with PREVENT. Thus, according to the mental model theory,
when CAUSE is composed with PREVENT, the resulting rela-
tion between the non-connected arguments, or conclusion, is
PREVENT.
CAUSAL MODEL THEORY
A second symbolic approach to causal composition is repre-
sented in Sloman et al. (2009) causal model theory. The causal
model theory represents an approach to causal composition based
on causal Bayesian networks. In causal Bayesian networks, vari-
ables are connected to one another with “arcs,” as in A → B.
Each arc is associated with a set of conditional probabilities in
conjunction with assumptions about the effect of actual or hypo-
thetical interventions (Woodward, 2003, 2007; Sloman, 2005;
Schulz et al., 2007). In the causal model theory, the notions of
CAUSE, ALLOW, and PREVENT are represented in terms of
different causal structures. When the causal relations are deter-
ministic, it is often convenient to represent variables and arrows of
a graph structure in terms of structural equations (Sloman et al.,
2009). In the causal model theory, structural equations, just as
in structural equation modeling (SEM), serve as a way to identify
and think about relationships between variables. For example, the
graph A → B can be instantiated in a structural equation such as
B:= A (Sloman et al., 2009; see also Hitchcock, 2001). The “:=”
relation differs from “equal to” in that variables on one side of
the relation cannot be moved to the other: causes must be kept
on one side and effects on the other. Loosely stated, “:=” can
be likened in meaning to the notion of “gets”; thus, rather than
saying “B equals A,” one could say “B gets A.” According to their
theory, the claim A causes B would be represented by the struc-
tural equation B:= A. The concept of ALLOW is associated with a
different structural equation; namely, the claim A allows B would
be represented as B:=A and X, in which the variable X is an acces-
sory variable. In the causal model theory, an accessory variable
is an additional causal factor or event that is necessary for the
main event, e.g., B, to occur. Accessory variables may either be
unknown or given by prior knowledge or given by the environ-
ment (Sloman et al., 2009). Sloman et al. (2009) speculate that the
concept of PREVENT is vaguer than CAUSE or ALLOW and, as a
consequence, may be represented by several structural equations.
On their account, the claim A prevents B could be represented by
either B:= ¬A, B:= ¬A and X, or B:= ¬A and ¬X1 . Negation
is handled using the negation operator. For example, whereas the
claim A causes B would be represented B:= A, the claim Not-A
causes B would be represented as B:= ¬A.
To account for relation composition, Sloman et al. (2009)
make several processing assumptions. According to one of these
assumptions, relations are combined via substitution. Consider,
for example, the following relations:
A causes B.
B causes C.
These two relations can be represented as
B:= A.
C:= B.
The theory holds that the representations can be combined with
respect to their common argument to obtain, through substitu-
tion, C:= A. According to the causal model theory, a structural
equation such as C:= A is characteristic of a CAUSE conclusion;
1When the causal model theory is applied to situations in which the vari-
ables are binary and the relations are deterministic, the truth conditions of
the equations can be derived from Boolean algebra. Thus, the equation B:= A
is consistent with B = true and A = true, B = false and A = false, and is not
consistent with B = true and A = false or B = false and A = true. Although
the causal model theory reduces to Boolean algebra in this context, Sloman
et al. (2009) note that the causal model theory remains relevant. First, it pro-
vides the motivation for the proposed structural equations and the fact that
causal graphs can be used directly to derive predictions. Second, causal model
theory can be applied to a range of arguments including arguments involving
uncertainty, different structural relations, intervention, and arguments with
arbitrarily-valued variables (see Hitchcock, 2001).
Table 2 | Important steps in composing CAUSE and PREVENT relations in the mental model theory.
Step1: represent premises Step 2: conjoin premises Step 3: reduce Step 4: interpret
A causes B B prevents C
a b b ¬c a b ¬c a ¬c A prevents C
¬a b ¬b c ¬a b ¬c ¬a c
¬a ¬b ¬b ¬c ¬a ¬b c ¬a ¬c
¬a ¬b ¬c
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hence, people should infer that the composition of two CAUSE
relations is another CAUSE relation. A different conclusion is
predicted from the composition of a CAUSE and an ALLOW
relation. The theory would represent the claims A causes B, B
allows C, with the structural equations: B:= A and C:= B and X.
Substituting the first “B” into the second equation would lead to
C:= A and X. According to the theory, such an equation would be
indicative of an ALLOW relation; hence, the theory predicts that
the composition of CAUSE and ALLOW would be an ALLOW
relation.
For certain relation compositions, the causal model theory,
unlike the mental model theory, predicts more than one con-
clusion. In particular, for compositions involving two PREVENT
relations, the causal model theory predicts either CAUSE or
ALLOW, depending on whether or not the PREVENT relations
include an accessory variable.
Negation is handled using the negation operator. For example,
while the claim A causes B would be represented B:= A, the claim
Not-A causes Bwould be represented as B:= ¬A. Interestingly, the
structural equation for Not-A causes B is the same as one of the
equations associated with PREVENT, since the claim A prevents
B can be represented as B:= ¬A. Absent effects are handled by
negation as well. For example, the claim A causes not-B would be
represented as ¬B:= A.
A PERCEPTUAL ICONIC THEORY OF CAUSAL COMPOSITION
THE FORCE THEORY
In this paper we introduce a new theory of causal composition,
the force theory. The force theory is based on Talmy’s (1988)
theory of force dynamics. In the force theory, individual inter-
actions involve two main entities: an affector and a patient (the
entity acted on by the affector). The theory holds that people
specify causal relations in terms of configurations of forces that
are evaluated with respect to an endstate. It is assumed that the
configurations of forces associated with different kinds of causal
relations can be directly aligned with the configuration of forces
present in various domains. In particular, it is assumed that peo-
ple specify the origin and direction of the various forces in a
configuration of forces, and to a limited extent, the magnitudes
of these forces. This alignment makes the representation of causa-
tion in the force theory iconic. An endstate can be conceptualized
as a location in a space that the patient either moves toward
or away from. The forces may be physical, psychological (e.g.,
intentions), or social (e.g., peer pressure) (Talmy, 1988; Wolff,
2007; Copley and Harley, 2014). It is assumed that people are
able to conduct partial reenactments of the processes that join
forces in the world (see Wolff and Zettergren, 2002; Wolff, 2007;
White, 2011, 2012; Hubbard, 2013b,c). A reenactment involves
specifying the objects and the forces acting on those objects as
well as carrying out a simulation. A simulation involves per-
forming a qualitative type of vector addition as specified and
empirically examined in Wolff ’s (2007) Experiment 4 (see also
Hubbard, 2010). The forces in these simulations are assumed to
be underspecified and often inaccurate, especially with respect to
magnitude (Wolff, 2007). As discussed in Hubbard (2005, 2012),
people’s notions of force may often be incorrect, but good enough
to be adaptive. It is also assumed that people may often infer
forces when they are not actually present, as when they infer forces
in the context of chance occurrences (e.g., closing a book and
the lights going out) or when watching a magic show (Wolff and
Shepard, 2013).
REPRESENTING INDIVIDUAL CAUSAL RELATIONS
The force theory predicts that there should be three main causal
concepts, CAUSE, HELP, and PREVENT. These three concepts
can be differentiated with respect to three dimensions: (a) the ten-
dency of the patient for an endstate, (b) the presence or absence
of concordance between the affector and the patient, and (c)
progress toward the endstate (essentially, whether or not the result
occurs). Table 3 summarizes how these dimensions differentiate
the concepts of CAUSE, HELP (also ALLOW and ENABLE), and
PREVENT. When we say, for example, High winds caused the tree
to fall, we mean that the patient (the tree) had no tendency to fall
(Tendency=No), the affector (the wind) acted against the patient
(Concordance = No), and the result (falling) occurred (Endstate
approached = Yes).
The force theory specifies how the notions of tendency, con-
cordance, and progress toward the endstate can be instantiated in
non-linguistic terms, namely in terms of force and position vec-
tors. The way the theory does this is shown in Figure 2. Each scene
in Figure 2 shows a situation involving a pool of water, a boat
with an outboard engine, a bank of fans, and a buoy. Below each
scene is a free-body diagram which makes explicit the direction
and relative magnitude of the forces in each scene.
As is customary in the construction of free-body diagrams
in physics, the forces are shown acting on only one object, the
patient; the free-body diagrams do not show the locations of the
affector (i.e., A), only the direction and magnitude of the affec-
tor’s force on the patient. In each of the configurations shown
in Figure 2, the patient is associated with a force (i.e., P). The
force associated with the patient, P, can be generated in a num-
ber of ways, including from gravity or mechanisms internal to
the patient, or from the patient’s resistance to changes in speed
or direction due to frictional forces or momentum (Wolff, 2007).
Copley and Harley (2014) provide a compelling argument for the
view that the force associated with the patient is often best under-
stood as emerging from the patient’s position in a “normal field.”
In their account, the normal field gives rise to an object’s tendency
to fall due to gravity, as well as more abstract tendencies such as an
entity’s tendency to “grow,” “redden” or “straighten.” In Figure 2,
the patient’s force corresponds to the force generated by the boat’s
motor.
According to the force theory, the patient has a tendency for
the end-state when the patient vector, P, points in the same
Table 3 | Representations of several causal concepts.
Patient tendency
for endstate
Affector-patient
concordance
Endstate
approached
CAUSE No No Yes
HELP (also ALLOW
and ENABLE)
Yes Yes Yes
PREVENT Yes No No
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FIGURE 2 | The images above each depict a scene showing a boat,
a bank of fans, and a cone. In the CAUSE scene, the boat motors
away from the cone, but is pushed back to the cone by the fans. In
the HELP scene, the boat motors toward the cone, and the fans push
it along in the same direction. In the PREVENT scene, the boat motors
toward the cone, but the fans push it back away from the cone.
Free-body diagrams associated with each type of causation are shown
below each scene. In these diagrams, A, the affector force, P, the
patient force, R, the resultant force, and E, endstate vector, which is a
position vector, not a force.
direction as the end-state vector, E; otherwise, P points in a dif-
ferent direction. The patient’s tendency for a particular endstate
is similar to the Bayesian notion of a prior probability because
it expresses what will happen before other factors are taken into
account. It differs from being a prior probability in that it does not
express an uncertainty. Returning to the force theory, the patient
and the affector are in concordance when their respective vectors
point in the same direction. Finally, a patient entity will approach
the end-state when the resultant (sum) of the A and P vectors, R,
is in the same direction as the end-state vector, E. Importantly,
the end-state vector, E, is a position vector, not a direction vector.
Hence, the length of the end-state vector specifies how close the
patient is to reaching the end-state.
Support for the force theory’s account of CAUSE, ALLOW,
and PREVENT was provided in a series of experiments in
which participants categorized 3-D animations of realistically
rendered objects with trajectories that were wholly determined
by the force vectors entered into a physics simulator. As reported
in Wolff (Wolff and Zettergren, 2002; Wolff, 2007), people’s
descriptions of the events closely matched the predictions of the
model.
COMBINING RELATIONS IN THE FORCE THEORY
In addition to explaining the representation of individual causal
relations, the force theory also explains how individual rela-
tions can be joined to form causal chains and how these chains
may then be used to derive new overarching causal relations.
In the force theory, a new overarching configuration of forces
is derived by selecting and adding certain forces from the
sub-configurations. Specifically, an affector force is determined
by selecting the affector force from the first sub-configuration
of forces; a patient force is derived from the vector addition
of all of the patient forces in the sub-configurations; and an
endstate vector is determined by selecting the endstate vec-
tor from the last sub-configuration of forces. While the pro-
cess used for deriving an overarching configuration of forces
is the same across all types of causal chains, the manner in
which the causal chains is constructed in the first place depends
on whether the chain involves the transmission or removal of
forces.
In transmissions of force, the resultant of the first sub-
configuration of forces is used as the affector of the subsequent
configuration of forces. The idea can be explained in terms of
a simple sequence of collision events like the one depicted in
Figure 3. In Figure 3, car A begins moving first, it hits B, and B
then hits C, sending C over the line. The animation can be sum-
marized by the sentence A caused C to cross the line, implying that
the individual relations in the causal chain can be combined to
form an overarching causal relationship between non-contiguous
entities2 .
Figure 4 offers a different view of the same sequence of events
shown in Figure 3. On the left side of Figure 4 is a picture of
the first frame of the animation. Above car B and C are CAUSE
configurations of forces. In the first CAUSE configuration, the
affector force (A) comes from car A and the patient force (B)
comes from car B. In the second CAUSE configuration, the affec-
tor force is the resultant of the A and B forces in the first CAUSE
configuration. The patient force in the second CAUSE config-
uration is C, specifically, its resistance to moving forward. The
resultant of the affector and patient forces acting on the third car
sends it over the line. In Figure 4, the direction and speed of A
and B are determined by the direction and magnitude of the (red)
affector vectors acting on A and B.
Whereas some causal chains involve transmissions of force,
other causal chains involve the removal of a force. When a chain
2The availability of a construal that highlights just the initial and final ele-
ments of causal chain has been referred to in the linguistics literature as
windowing of attention (Talmy, 2000). The phenomenon was also noted by
Michotte (1946/1963) as the tool effect: In a three object chain, A appears
to launch C while B simply “drops out” as if it were a tool for A (Hubbard,
2013a).
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FIGURE 3 | The animation instantiates a CAUSE/CAUSE causal
chain in which A causes B, and B causes C. A begins moving
first. It hits B, sending B into C, which then moves over the
line. The arrows indicate the direction of the cars’ motion. The
animation can be summarized by the sentence A caused C to
cross the line.
FIGURE 4 | Above cars B and C are CAUSE configurations of forces. The
smaller vectors pointing to the left are the patient vectors acting on cars B
and C (i.e., friction). The longer vectors (with big heads) pointing to the right
are affector vectors and the dashed vectors are the resultant vectors. In this
sequence of collisions, the resultant vector associated with car B becomes
the affector vector acting on car C. On the right side are two free-body
diagrams depicting the same configurations of forces shown on the left, but
this time, they are arranged vertically rather than horizontally. In the free-body
diagrams, the line pointing down shows how the resultant of the first CAUSE
configuration becomes the affector in the second CAUSE configuration.
involves the removal of a force, the manner in which resultant
forces become affector forces reverses. To illustrate, consider, a
chain of PREVENT relations such as A PREVENTS B and B
PREVENTS C. A chain of PREVENT relations is known as a dou-
ble prevention (Collins, 2000; Hall, 2000, 2004, 2006; Schaffer,
2000; Dowe, 2001; McGrath, 2005; Sartorio, 2005; Livengood and
Machery, 2007; Lombrozo, 2010; Wolff et al., 2010; Walsh and
Sloman, 2011). At first glance, it may be unclear how a double pre-
vention could be realized because if A prevents B, B cannot then
prevent C because B has already been prevented. The solution to
how a double prevention can occur rests in the order in which
the prevent relations are realized. In particular, a double preven-
tion can occur if the second prevent relation is realized before the
first prevent relation is realized. So, for example, if A prevents B
and B prevents C, such a chain can occur if B is first preventing
C and then A prevents B. The intuition behind this can be illus-
trated with a real world example. Consider pulling a plug to allow
water to flow down a drain. Such a sequence of PREVENTs begin
with the plug (B) preventing the water (C) from draining (that is
the second relation in the double prevention). Then, someone (A)
prevents B by pulling the plug, that is, by removing B’s force on C.
Note that when A pulls B, A opposes not just the force associated
with B, but also the force associated with C, that is, the resultant
of the B and C forces (the plug and the water). Thus, in the case
of double prevention, the resultant of the second premise (CB),
which is computed first, serves as the patient vector in the first
premise (BCB). The way forces are transmitted in a double pre-
vention can be illustrated in a different way based on the chain
depicted in Figure 5.
In the beginning of the animation depicted in Figure 5, C
approaches the line. B prevents C from crossing the line by pulling
C back with a rope. The middle panel shows A pushing B back,
thereby loosening the rope between B and C. In the panel on
the far right, with the removal of B’s force on C, C crosses the
line. The animation can be summarized by the sentence A allowed
C to cross the line, implying that the individual relations in the
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sequences of events can be combined to form an overarching
causal relationship between non-contiguous entities. A differ-
ent way of viewing the same sequence of events is shown in
Figure 6.
On the left side of Figure 6 is a frame from one of the mid-
dle frames of the animation. Above B and C are PREVENT
configurations of forces. On the left side of Figure 6, in the sec-
ond PREVENT configuration (involving car C), the affector force
comes from car B and the patient force comes from car C. In the
first PREVENT configuration (on the left side of Figure 6), the
affector force comes from A while the patient force comes from
the sum of the forces B and C, that is, BC.
On the right side of Figure 6 is a pair of free-body diagrams
depicting the same configuration of forces shown in the frame of
the animation, this time arranged vertically. The diagram above
depicts the configuration of forces acting on car B, while the dia-
gram below depicts the configuration of forces acting on car C. As
discussed above, in chains of PREVENT relations, the resultant of
the second PREVENT configuration serves as the patient vector
in the first PREVENT configuration. This transmission of forces
is reflected in the vertical arrow connecting the resultant vector
in the lower configuration with the patient vector in the higher
configuration.
COMPOSING CAUSAL RELATIONS
As discussed earlier, the process of composing causal relations
involves constructing an overall summative configuration of
forces based on all of the configurations in the chain. Whether
the chain involves the transfer or removal of a force, the manner
in which a summary configuration is derived remains the same.
Figure 7 shows how a summary configuration is derived from a
chain of two CAUSE relations. As depicted in Figure 7, the affec-
tor in the summary configuration is the affector from the first
relation (A); the end-state is based on the end-state vector in the
last relation (E); and the patient in the summary configuration is
derived by summing all of the remaining forces in the causal chain
(B + C).
ALLOW RELATIONS
The force theory offers an account of how people represent
ALLOW relations. Following McGrath (2003), we propose that
ALLOW relations are necessarily based on double preventions
(see also Barbey and Wolff, 2007; Wolff et al., 2010). In the sim-
plest case, ALLOW relations involve removing a force that was
originally preventing an event from happening. An example is
given in the animation depicted in Figure 5: when A pushes B
toward C, it allows C to cross the line. This account of ALLOW
FIGURE 5 | The still frames depict key stages in a PREVENT/
PREVENT chain. First, C attempts to cross the line but is prevented
by B. Then, A pushes B toward C, preventing B from preventing C.
With the removal of B’s preventive force, C crosses the line. The
animation can be summarized by the sentence A allowed C to cross
the line.
FIGURE 6 | The scene depicts the configuration of forces instantiated
in a PREVENT/PREVENT causal chain. The smaller vectors pointing left
and right are patient vectors, while the longer vectors (with big heads) are
affector vectors. The dashed vectors are resultant vectors. On the right
side are two free-body diagrams depicting the same forces shown on the
left arranged vertically. In the diagrams, the vector E is the position vector
pointing to the end-state, which, in the animation on the left, is the area
on the right side of the line. Note that in a double prevention, the
resultant vector of B and C, CB, becomes the patient vector in the
interaction between cars B and A.
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FIGURE 7 | The affector force in the summary configuration, A, is the
affector force in the first relation, A. The end-state in the summary
configuration is the end-state vector from the last relation. The patient force
in the summary configuration, C, is based on the vector addition of all of
the patient forces in the chain (B and C).
was supported in a set of studies described in Wolff et al. (2010).
Participants saw animations like the one shown in Figure 5 and
were asked to choose one of several possible descriptions. Across
a range of double preventions, participants indicated that the rela-
tionship between the first and last entities in a double prevention
instantiated an ALLOW relation.We further propose that the con-
cepts of ENABLE and LET are closely related to that of ALLOW.
All three concepts entail double preventions but differ slightly
in the manner in which the particular PREVENT relations are
instantiated3. In all cases of double prevention, the chaining of
two PREVENT relations leads to what could be called a posi-
tive relation, much like double negatives in a sentence imply a
positive.
ACCOUNTING FOR NEGATION
The force theory offers an account of the negation of causal rela-
tions. There are two kinds of causal negation, one of which is
causation by omission. Causation by omission is causation in
which an absence of an influence brings about an effect, as in
The absence of nicotine causes withdrawal orNot watering the plant
caused it to wilt (Schaffer, 2000; Wolff et al., 2010). Causation of
omission can be expressed by a not-operator applied to the first
argument of a cause relation, as in ¬A CAUSES B. In this paper,
we refer to a causal relation like ¬A CAUSES B with the expres-
sions ¬CAUSE or ¬C. Following McGrath (2003), we propose
that causation by omission is another way of describing a double-
prevention. When we say A PREVENTS B and B PREVENTS C,
we can re-express the double prevention as causation by omis-
sion: the lack of B allows/causes C. In a series of studies in
3In the following experiments, all references to the concept of ALLOW assume
that the underlying forces form a double prevention. We limited the forces
underlying double prevention to those leading to an ALLOW conclusion in
a qualitative manner, specifically, by only using the patient vector in the sec-
ond premise of the double prevention. We further assume the resultant of an
ALLOW relation that is passed on to the next relation is based on the vector
addition of all of the (non-derived) forces in the two PREVENT relations, not
just the resultant of the last PREVENT relation in the double prevention. It is
in this way that the two prevention relations are treated as a single unit in the
causal chain.
Wolff et al. (2010), we found evidence for this proposal: when
shown animations of double preventions, people endorsed state-
ments stating that the lack of the second entity (i.e., B) in a double
prevention allowed or caused the occurrence of the third entity. In
particular, when people were shown double preventions like the
one shown in Figure 6, they were willing to endorse the statement
the absence of B caused/allowed C to cross the line. With respect
to the force theory, an expression like ¬A CAUSES B entails the
occurrence of a double prevention before the CAUSE relation,
thus leading to a three-premise chain, that is, A PREVENTS B,
B PREVENTS C, and C CAUSES D. A conclusion is generated
between the A and D entities like any other relation composition.
This conclusion is then re-phrased in terms of the absence of the
second entity, i.e., Lack of B caused D (Wolff et al., 2010). It should
be noted that in causation resulting from an omission, force is not
transmitted from the cause to the effect; rather, a force is removed
or not realized and an effect results (Wolff et al., 2010).
A second kind of causal negation is the causation of an absence,
as exemplified in expressions of the form A CAUSES ¬B, or
more intuitively, by such statements as Pain causes lack of sleep
and Black holes allow no escape. We propose that people rep-
resent causation of an absence by treating the negation of the
consequent as a PREVENT relation in the causal chain. The
PREVENT relation is added to the causal chain by assuming an
unnamed entity—which can be referred to by x—to connect the
relations. Expressions of the form A CAUSES ¬B are thereby
represented as A CAUSES x, x PREVENTS B. The overarching
relation implied by this causal chain is based on the relation
composition of CAUSE and PREVENT relations, which accord-
ing to the force theory, is a PREVENT relation virtually 100% of
the time. Thus, according to the force theory A CAUSES ¬B is
virtually synonymous with A PREVENTS B4.
ACCOUNTING FOR MULTIPLE CONCLUSIONS
As discussed in the previous sections, the composition of a dou-
ble prevention can lead to an ALLOW conclusion. However,
interestingly, the composition of a double prevention sometimes
leads to a CAUSE conclusion (McGrath, 2003; Barbey and Wolff,
2006, 2007; Chaigneau and Barbey, 2008; Sloman et al., 2009;
Wolff et al., 2010). Consider, for example, the double preven-
tion instantiated in dropping a pencil to the floor: initially, a
person prevents the pencil from falling by holding it in his or
her hand, but this prevention is prevented by opening the hand,
with the pencil falling as a result. One could describe this sit-
uation as instantiating an ALLOW relation: The person allowed
the pencil to fall to the floor, but one could also describe the
situation as instantiating a CAUSE relation: The person caused
the pencil to fall to the floor. Some scenarios seem to be biased
more toward ALLOW interpretations, such allowing water to flow
down the drain by pulling a plug. Other scenarios are more biased
toward CAUSE interpretations. Imagine a situation in which a
person knocks out a post resulting in the collapse of a roof. It
sounds more natural to say the person caused the roof to collapse
4When the magnitude of the patient is 0, the configuration of forces is poten-
tially compatible with A CAUSES¬B but not A PREVENTS B, and it is because
of this one difference that the two expressions are not perfectly synonymous.
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than that he allowed the roof to collapse. The question of what
biases a double prevention toward CAUSE or ALLOW is inter-
esting, but for present purposes, we point out that the force
theory predicts that double preventions are potentially ambigu-
ous between CAUSE and ALLOW relations. The reason why is
highlighted exemplified by the two double prevention shown in
Figure 8.
As shown on the left side of Figure 8, in some double preven-
tions, adding the two patient vectors in the premises results in a
patient vector in the conclusion (C) that points toward the end-
state, leading to an ALLOW configuration. On the other hand, as
shown on the right side of Figure 8, adding the patient vectors can
also result in a patient in the conclusion pointing away from the
endstate, resulting in a CAUSE configuration. Although certain
sets of premises may be compatible with more than one conclu-
sion, the force theory makes it possible to determine the prob-
ability of any conclusion for a given set of premises. One way in
which these probabilities can be calculated is by using integral cal-
culus, as explained in Appendix B of the Supplemental Materials.
Another way is to use an iterative procedure that varies themagni-
tudes of each of the forces in the causal chain and then counts the
number of times a particular conclusion is generated. A program
has been written to conduct such a process (http://psychology.
emory.edu/cognition/wolff/software.html). The results from this
simulation (as well as from integral calculus) indicate that dou-
ble preventions will lead to ALLOW conclusions 62% of the
time, and CAUSE conclusions 38% of the time. In other rela-
tion compositions, only one conclusion is predicted. For example,
the composition CAUSE◦PREVENT is predicted to give rise to
PREVENT conclusions 100% of the time. In still other relation
compositions, the theory still predicts only one conclusion, but at
a weaker level. For example, the composition PREVENT◦CAUSE
gives rise to PREVENT conclusions 37% of the time. The
remaining 63% of the conclusions are associated with an unde-
fined configuration of forces. Under these conditions, we pre-
dict that people would associate a PREVENT◦CAUSE compo-
sition with a PREVENT conclusion, but to a weaker degree
than they would a CAUSE◦PREVENT composition, which result
in PREVENT conclusions 100% of the time. Thus, in the
absence of clear information about the magnitude of the vec-
tors, the force theory explains how a particular causal chain
may be probabilistically related to a particular conclusion. In
effect, the force theory explains how different causal structures
can give rise to different probability distributions for different
conclusions.
SUMMARY AND PREDICTIONS OF THE THEORIES
As discussed in the previous sections, three theories provide
accounts of how people compose causal relations. Each of these
theories makes assumptions about the basic units of cognition
that are involved in causal reasoning, the complexes of units that
define causal relations, the processes involved in causal composi-
tion, and the number of conclusions that may follow from a par-
ticular causal composition. These assumptions are summarized in
Table 4.
One of the key differences between the three theories concerns
whether they predict causal composition can give rise to multiple
conclusions. The mental model theory predicts a single conclu-
sion for each composition, whereas the causal model theory and
the force theory predict that certain causal compositions can give
rise to multiple conclusions. The indeterminacy predicted by the
force theory may come as a surprise given the theory’s ground-
ing in perceptual experience. The indeterminacy predicted by the
force theory does not simply emerge with the shift to multiple
events: in the force theory, a particular kind of causal relation
(e.g., CAUSE) viewedmultiple times will give rise to a set of causal
relations of the same kind (e.g., CAUSE). Rather, the indetermi-
nacy predicted by the force theory emerges with a shift from single
relations to causal chains viewed multiple times: the theory pre-
dicts that relation compositions conducted over the same kind of
causal chain multiple times will sometimes give rise to different
kinds of overarching causal relations. In effect, the force theory
offers an account of how deterministic causation might be related
to probabilistic causation.
Arguably, the most important difference between the three
theories concerns the basic units of cognition. In the case of the
mental model and causal model theories, the underlying unit
complexes are abstract. In the case of the force theory, in con-
trast, the underlying units are iconic. The iconic nature of the
mental units in the force theory allow it to make predictions that
the other theories cannot make. In particular, the force theory is
able to make predictions about how causal chains and their nega-
tions may be instantiated in the physical world. This is potentially
important because if the force theory is right, then the mental
codes used in the perception of causal events may be the same
codes used in causal reasoning.
EXPERIMENT 1
In the following experiment we examined whether the configu-
rations of forces specified in the force model can be entered into
a physical simulator to produce animations reflecting real-world
FIGURE 8 | The composition of two PREVENT relations can either lead to an ALLOW (left side) or CAUSE (right side) conclusion.
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causal chains and then whether these animations are identified
by people as instantiating the kinds of causal relations specified
in the theory. These predictions were tested by creating the nine
possible kinds of causal chains that can be formed from all pos-
sible pairings of CAUSE, ALLOW, and PREVENT. The nine types
of animations used in this experiment are listed in Table 5, two
of which were depicted in Figures 3, 5. The force theory not only
predicts how different kinds of causal chains might be instanti-
ated in the physical world, but also how these causal chains might
be described. The mental model and causal theories are unable to
predict how various kinds of causal chains might be instantiated,
but are able to predict how these chains might be described once
the chains are represented in terms recognized by the theories.
The predictions of the three theories are shown in Table 5.
As can be seen in Table 5, for this particular set of relation
compositions, the three theories make very similar predictions
about how the various kinds of causal chains might be composed,
though there are a few differences. For several of the compo-
sitions, the force theory predicts more than one conclusion;
however, in each case, one conclusion is predicted to dominate.
The causal model theory also predicted more than one response
for one of the causal chains, P/P, that is for double prevention.
However, while the causal model theory predicts that double pre-
ventions can lead to either CAUSE or ALLOW conclusions, it does
not specify which of these responses should dominate. Given that
the causal model is silent with respect to which responses should
dominate, we assigned to the theory the prediction that ALLOW
and CAUSE relations should each be expected to appear 50% of
the time.
There were two sub-experiments. The purpose of Experiment
1a was to verify that the causal chains used in the following
Experiment 1b contained the intended component relations. The
purpose of Experiment 1b was to test whether participants com-
bined the sub-relations as predicted by the three theories.
EXPERIMENT 1A
In this experiment, each of the animations used in the follow-
ing experiment, Experiment 1b, were re-rendered as two separate
animations: one showing the cars involved in the first causal rela-
tion and the other showing the cars used in the second causal
relation. For example, in a CAUSE/CAUSE causal chain, partic-
ipants saw an animation showing either cars A and B or cars
B and C. After watching an animation, participants choose the
expression that best described the relation between the cars in the
animation (e.g., A and B or B and C). The expressions named
two cars joined by the verbs cause, allow, or prevent, or the option
“none of the above.” The choices predicted by the force theory are
shown in the bottom half of Table 6.
Methods
Participants. The participants were 24 Emory University under-
graduates who took part in the study for course credit. All par-
ticipants were native speakers of English. In this and all following
experiments, participants gave informed consent in accordance
with the requirements of the Internal Review Board at Emory
University.
Materials. Eighteen 3D animations were made from an anima-
tion package called Autodesk 3 3ds Max 8. The eighteen anima-
tions depicted either the first or second part of one of nine causal
chains: A/A, A/C, A/P, C/A, C/C, C/P, P/A, P/C, and P/P. The
direction and speed of the cars was calculated using a physics
simulator called Havok Reactor, which is a sub-program in 3ds
Max. The mass of each car, including its wheels, was 5 kg (approx-
imately 11 pounds). Table A1 in the Supplementary Materials
shows of the forces in Newtons entered into the physics simulator
for each of the cars that appeared in the animations. As amatter of
comparison, the amount of force exerted by gravity on an object
with a mass of 1 kg near the surface of the earth is approximately
10 N. The number of cars differed across the animations because
the different kinds of relation compositions required different
numbers of forces. For example, a C/C chain only requires three
cars in order to instantiate three unique forces (see Figures 3, 4),
whereas a C/A chain requires four cars in order to instantiate
four unique forces because the ALLOW relation is composed of
two PREVENT relations. All of the interactions occurred within
Table 4 | Three models of causal composition and how they compare on several key dimensions.
Mental model theory Causal model theory Force theory
Basic units of cognition States of affairs Variable/event states Forces
Basic relations between units Co-occurrence Functional relation Spatial orientation/Relative magnitude
Complexes of units defining causal relations Mental models Structural equations Configurations of force
Process involved in relation composition Conjoining mental models Variable substitution Vector addition
Number of conclusions per composition One Sometimes more than one Sometimes more than one
Table 5 | Predicted relation composition for each type of causal chain animation used in Experiment 1.
A/A A/C A/P C/A C/C C/P P/A P/C P/P
Mental model theory A A P A C P P P P
Causal model theory A A P A C P P P A (50%) C (50%)
Force theory A A (76%) C (24%) P A (76%) C (24%) C P P P A (62%) C (38%)
C, “Cause”; A, “Allow”; P, “Prevent.”
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Table 6 | Experiments 1a predictions and results for entire chains [Mean (SD)] and Experiment 1b predictions and results individual component
relations [Mean (SD)].
Composition A/A A/C A/P C/A C/C C/P P/A P/C P/P
Prediction A A P A C P P P C (62%) A (38%)
“Cause” 0.04 (0.204) 0.08 (0.282) 0.04 (0.204) 0.17 (0.381) 0.79 (0.415) 0.08 (0.282) 0.04 (0.204) − 0.50 (0.511)
“Allow” 0.63 (0.495) 0.67 (0.482) 0.13 (0.338) 0.67 (0.482) 0.13 (0.338) − 0.08 (0.282) 0.04 (0.204) 0.50 (0.511)
“Prevent” 0.13 (0.338) 0.04 (0.204) 0.50 (0.511) 0.04 (0.204) − 0.83 (0.381) 0.79 (0.415) 0.88 (0.338) −
“No verb” 0.21 (0.415) 0.21 (0.415) 0.33 (0.482) 0.13 (0.338) 0.08 (0.282) 0.08 (0.282) 0.08 (0.282) 0.08 (0.282) −
1ST RELATION
Prediction A A A C C C P P P
“Cause” 0.04 (0.204) 0.04 (0.204) 0.13 (0.338) 0.42 (0.504) 0.88 (0.338) 0.92 (0.282) 0.17 (0.381) − 0.08 (0.282)
“Allow” 0.71 (0.464) 0.79 (0.415) 0.75 (0.442) 0.25 (0.442) 0.04 (0.204) − 0.08 (0.282) 0.08 (0.282) 0.08 (0.282)
“Prevent” 0.08 (0.282) − − 0.38 (0.495) − 0.04 (0.204) 0.67 (0.482) 0.79 (0.415) 0.79 (0.415)
“No verb” 0.17 (0.381) 0.17 (0.381) 0.13 (0.338) 0.21 (0.415) 0.08 (0.282) 0.04 (0.204) 0.08 (0.282) 0.04 (0.204) 0.04 (0.204)
2ND RELATION
Prediction A C P A C P A C P
“Cause” 0.04 (0.204) 0.50 (0.511) − 0.08 (0.282) 1 (0) − 0.04 (0.204) 0.83 (0.381) −
“Allow” 0.79 (0.415) − − 0.83 (0.381) − − 0.54 (0.509) 0.04 (0.204) −
“Prevent” 0.04 (0.204) 0.13 (0.338) 0.96 (0.204) 0.04 (0.204) − 0.96 (0.204) 0.08 (0.282) 0.04 (0.204) 0.96 (0.204)
“No verb” 0.13 (0.338) 0.38 (0.495) 0.04 (0.204) 0.04 (0.204) − 0.04 (0.204) 0.33 (0.482) 0.08 (0.282) 0.04 (0.204)
Participant’s modal responses are in bold.
a single dimension; as a consequence, the directions of the forces
listed in Table A1 are described as either to the right or left. In
this simulated world, the cars were 2 feet, 5 inches. The camera
was directed toward the center of the interaction at an angle of
15 degrees and was located 18 feet, 8 inches away from the cen-
ter of action. In every animation, A was green, B was red, C was
blue, D was yellow, and E was purple. The cars moved over a gray
cement surface and the sky was a slightly lighter gray. The anima-
tions used in this experiment can be viewed at http://psychology.
emory.edu/cognition/wolff/animations.html.
Procedure. The animations were presented in random order
on Windows-based computers using E-Prime (version 2.0) by
Psychology Software tools. Participants were told that they would
see a series of animations in which cars bumped into or pulled
one another. After each animation, participants chose a sentence
that best described the occurrence. All of the sentences named
the first and last cars in the causal chain and were the same
(A____ C to [from] cross[ing] the line) except for the verb, which
was caused, allowed or prevented. Another option was none of the
above. Participants were instructed to choose the sentence that
best described what actually occurred in the scene, not what could
have occurred. Participants indicated their answers by clicking a
radio button next to their choice.
Results and discussion
As shown in the lower two sections of Table 6, participants
described the two parts of the causal compositions as intended.
For the animations depicting the first and second relations of
the A/A chain, participants chose the sentences containing allow
and allow, χ2(3, N = 24) = 30.2, p < 0.0001, χ2(2, N = 24) =
24.56, p < 0.0001; for the animations depicting the first and sec-
ond relations of the A/C chain, participants chose the sentences
containing allow and cause, χ2(2, N = 24) = 25.04, p < 0.0001,
χ2(2, N = 24) = 6.08, p < 0.05; for the animations depicting the
first and second relations of the A/P chain, participants chose the
sentences containing allow and prevent, χ2(1, N = 24) = 6.76,
p < 0.01, χ2(1, N = 24) = 21.16, p < 0.001; for the animations
depicting the first and second relations of the C/C chain, partici-
pants chose the sentences containing cause and cause, χ2(2, N =
24) = 31.75, p < 0.0001, χ2(1, N = 24) = 18.62, p < 0.0001;
for the animations depicting the first and second relations of the
C/P chain, participants chose sentences containing cause and pre-
vent, χ2(1,N = 24) = 12.46, p < 0.0001, χ2(1,N = 24) = 20.17,
p < 0.0001; for the animations depicting the first and second rela-
tions of the P/A chain, participants chose sentences containing
prevent and allow, χ2(2, N = 24) = 12.00, p < 0.01, χ2(3, N =
24) = 15.67, p = 0.001; for the animations depicting the first and
second relations of the P/C chain, participants chose the sentences
containing prevent and cause,χ2(2,N = 24)= 27.91, p < 0.0001,
χ2(2, N = 24) = 27.0, p < 0.001; and for the animations depict-
ing the first and second relations in the P/P chain, participants
chose the sentences containing prevent and prevent, χ2(2, N =
24) = 23.25, p < 0.0001, χ2(1, N = 24) = 20.167, p < 0.001. In
the case of the C/A chain, the most frequently chosen sentence for
the first relation was the one containing cause, as predicted, but
participant’s choices in this case did not differ from chance, χ2(3,
N = 24) = 3.25, p = 0.355. For the animation depicting the sec-
ond relation of the C/A chain, participants’ modal response was
allow, χ2(2, N = 24) = 28.88, p < 0.0001.
EXPERIMENT 1B
The goal of this experiment was to examine how people
form causal compositions from depictions of causal chains.
Participants saw animations of various kinds of causal chains.
For example, in one case, participants saw an animation of a
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CAUSE/CAUSE causal chain involving three cars, A, B, and C.
After watching an animation, participants choose the expression
that best described the relation between the first and last cars in
the chain (e.g., A and C). The expressions named two cars joined
by the verbs cause, allow, or prevent, or the option “none of the
above.” Participants’ predicted choices are shown in the top half
of Table 6.
Methods
Participants. The participants were 25 Emory University under-
graduates who took part in the study for course credit. None of
the participants in the current study participated in Experiment
1a. All participants were native speakers of English.
Materials. Nine 3D animations were made from an anima-
tion package called Autodesk 3 3ds Max 8 as described in
Experiment 1a.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1a.
Participants watched animations and then chose a sentence that
best described what they saw. The sentences named the first and
last cars in the animation. The sentence choices were the same as
in Experiment 1a.
Results and Discussion
The predictions of the force theory were fully borne out by the
results. The top of Table 6 shows the percentage of times people
chose each of the four options for each of the nine chains.
As shown at the top of Table 6, for every type of causal chain,
people chose the sentence that matched the relation composition
predicted by the force theory. Specifically, for the animation
depicting the A/A chain, people chose the sentence contain allow,
χ2(3, N = 25) = 21.56, p < 0.0001; for the A/C chain, they
chose the sentence containing allow, χ2(3, N = 25) = 26.04,
p < 0.0001; for the A/P chain, they chose the sentence containing
prevent, χ2(3, N = 25) = 13.88, p < 0.01; for the C/A chain,
they chose the sentence containing allow, χ2(3, N = 25) = 13.88,
p < 0.01; for the C/C chain, they chose the sentence containing
cause, χ2(2,N = 25) = 24.56, p < 0.0001; for the C/P chain, they
chose the sentence containing prevent, χ2(2, N = 25) = 11.56,
p = 0.001; for the P/A chain, they chose the sentence containing
prevent, χ2(2, N = 25) = 25.04, p < 0.0001; and for the P/C
chain, they chose the sentence containing prevent, χ2(2, N =
25) = 33.68, p < 0.0001. For the P/P chain, participants used
both cause or allow verbs, just as predicted by the force theory.
Since the percentages for the two choices were the same and
participants did not choose any of the other options, chi-square
could not be computed.
The results support the assumption of the force theory that
the representations specified in the theory are iconic since they
could be entered into a physics simulator to produce events that
were classified by people as predicted by the theory. In contrast
to the predictions made by the mental model theory, people did
not indicate that the double preventions should lead to PREVENT
relations. According to the force theory and the causal model the-
ory, double preventions can lead to either CAUSE or ALLOW
responses, which is exactly what was observed. The results from
Experiments 1a,b imply that the simulation of causal chains may
be based on mental units that are also capable of supporting
a particular kind of causal reasoning in the form of relation
composition.
ABSTRACT CAUSATION AND FORCES
The results from Experiments 1 demonstrate how the process of
composing causal relations might be based on representations of
physical forces, but also suggest how the process of composing
causal relations might occur in the case of abstract causal rela-
tions, such as Tax cuts cause economic growth and Competition
prevents inflation. Evidence from cognitive psychology, cognitive
linguistics, and cognitive neuroscience has converged on the idea
that people may recruit representations from the physical domain
to understand the abstract, a proposal that has sometimes been
called the redeployment hypothesis (Boroditsky, 2001; Gentner
et al., 2002; Casasanto and Boroditsky, 2008; DeWall et al., 2010;
Chafee and Crowe, 2013; Parkinson et al., 2014). In the case of
the force theory, extending it from physical forces to abstract
forces (e.g., social forces) requires no change to the underlying
processing mechanisms. For example, if told that Stress causes for-
getfulness and Forgetfulness causes confusion, people may represent
the component causal relations by imagining CAUSE configura-
tions of forces like the one shown in Figure 2. The forces in this
case, would not be physical forces, but instead abstract influences.
The magnitude of the vectors would not be precise, but they
would not need to be because the force theory already assumes
that people do not have access to exact magnitudes of the forces
(Wolff, 2007); what they do have is knowledge of the relative mag-
nitudes and directions of the forces. Peoplemay represent abstract
versions of ALLOW and PREVENT by generating ALLOW and
PREVENT configurations of forces. Once abstract relations are
represented in terms of configurations of forces, the processes
used for composing configurations of forces in the physical world
can be recruited for composing configurations of forces in the
non-physical world.
Data already exists on the kinds of conclusions people draw
when they compose abstract causal relations. In Experiment 4
of Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird (2001), participants were pre-
sented with 16 different types of causal chains and were asked to
write out a conclusion. To minimize the effect of prior knowl-
edge, the relations in the chains involved abstract psychological
terms such as compliance, anxiety, and depression. Such terms are
vague enough that when they are placed in a causal chain, the
entire chain sounds plausible. For example, one of the sequences
read as follows:
Obedience allows motivation to increase.
Increased motivation causes eccentricity.
What, if anything, follows?
The specific 16 chains are listed in Table 7, along with the relation
compositions predicted by the mental model theory, the causal
model theory, and force theory. Table 6 also shows the most fre-
quent relation composition chosen by participants in Goldvarg
and Johnson-Laird’s (2001) Experiment 4.
The chains examined in Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird’s (2001)
Experiment 4 included the nine causal chains examined in
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Experiment 1a, plus seven others. All told, the mental model
theory predicted the modal conclusion produced by the partici-
pants for all 16 causal chains. The causal model theory and the
force theory also did reasonably well, each accounting for the
modal conclusion for 13 of the 16 compositions. These results
provide some initial evidence that the predictions of the force
theory extend beyond the just the physical domain.
For several chains, the predictions of the force theory, as well
as of the causal model theory, diverged from what was observed.
One such chain was A/P. Whereas the mental model predicted
an ALLOW¬ (i.e., A allows ¬B) conclusion, both the force the-
ory and the causal model theory predicted PREVENT, which was
also the result observed in Experiment 1a. Another chain for
which the results differed was P/P. As discussed earlier, a sequence
of PREVENT relations constitutes double prevention, which,
according to many researchers and the results from Experiment
1a, should lead to either ALLOW or CAUSE compositions (Foot,
1967; McMahan, 1993; McGrath, 2003). One reason why partici-
pants may have chosen PREVENT over either CAUSE or ALLOW
in Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird (2001) is because of the “atmo-
sphere” of the chain (see Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird, 1999).
In particular, participants may have chosen a PREVENT con-
clusion because the relations in the premises were PREVENT
relations, not necessarily because the chain of two PREVENT
relations led to a PREVENT composition. The third conclusion
missed by both the causal model theory and the force theory
was A/¬C (i.e., A allows B, ¬B causes C): the mental model the-
ory predicted the observed modal response of ALLOW¬ (i.e., A
allows ¬B), whereas the causal model theory and the force theory
predicted the conclusion would be PREVENT. To better under-
stand the nature of these differences, we re-ran Goldvarg and
Johnson-Laird’s (2001) Experiment 4.
EXPERIMENT 2
The ability of three theories of causal composition to address
abstract causation was examined in this experiment. The mate-
rials used in this experiment were those used in Goldvarg and
Johnson-Laird’s (2001) Experiment 4. In particular, all of the
materials used in this experiment were based on psychological
terms that were highly familiar to the participants but also vague
enough that they could be used in different causal statements
with different relations and still sound plausible5 . For instance,
as an example of the causal chain P/A, participants read Learning
prevents anxiety, Anxiety allows fixation. Also as in Goldvarg and
Johnson-Laird (2001), negations were encoded with the word no.
For instance, one example of ¬C read No learning causes anxi-
ety. As described below, our analyses include an assessment of the
modal response and measures that are sensitive to the distribu-
tion of responses (t-tests computed over correlations). Both of
these measures will be important in our assessment: the modal
response equates the theories so that they (broadly speaking)
motivate only one (dominant) conclusion, whereas the correla-
tion analysis allows us to assess the more fine-grained predictions
of each theory.
5We thank Eugenia Goldvarg-Steingold and Phil Johnson-Laird for access to
their materials.
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In generating the predictions for the three theories in this
experiment and in the experiments to follow, we adopted Sloman
et al.’s matching assumption, which can be viewed as a type
of atmosphere effect (see Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird, 1999),
except that the effect does not necessarily lead to an incorrect
response. According to Sloman et al. (2009), people are biased
to generate causal compositions in which the arguments in the
conclusion match those in the premises. Thus, if the first premise
is given in terms of an absence, people will prefer to describe
the conclusion in terms of an absence. The matching assumption
turned out to be a good rule of thumb. However, there are cases
for which the matching assumption should probably be relaxed
since it occasionally lowers the fit to the data for all of the the-
ories, suggesting the existence of other biases; for example, there
may be a bias for conclusions without negations over those with
negations.
Methods
Participants. The participants were 20 Emory University under-
graduates who participated for course credit. None of the par-
ticipants in the current study participated in any of the other
experiments described in this paper. All participants were native
speakers of English.
Materials. The materials were based on two examples each of the
16 causal chains shown in Tables 6, 7. For example, the chain
C/C was instantiated by the pairs of sentences Obedience causes
motivation, Motivation causes eccentricity and Attention causes
rumination, Rumination causes paranoia. As demonstrated in
these examples, the premises were based on psychological terms
such as obedience,motivation, and paranoia. A complete list of the
materials is provided in Table A3 in the Appendix.
Procedure. The experiment was run on Windows-based comput-
ers using Presentation (version 12.2) byNeurobehavioral Systems.
Participants were told that the experiment concerned how people
reason on the basis of causal knowledge. They were told that
they would be presented with reasoning problems that consisted
of two statements, such as Smoking causes cancer, Cancer causes
health problems, which they should assume to be true. Each pair
of premises was followed by the question “What, if anything, fol-
lows?” For each pair of premises, participants were instructed
to type in a response. Participants were asked to think about
the premises carefully before drawing a conclusion, and they
were allowed to spend as much time as they needed on each
problem. Pairs of premises were presented one at a time in a dif-
ferent random order for each participant. The authors coded the
participants’ responses as to the type of conclusion generated.
Design. Participants were randomly assigned one of two lists.
Each list contained one half of the materials, which included one
example each of the 16 possible compositions.
Results and Discussion
The results provided support for all three models of causal com-
position. The predictions of the three models and the percentage
of times these predictions were observed are shown in Table 86.
A comparison between these results and those of Goldvarg and
Johnson-Laird (2001), reported in Table 7, shows a relatively high
level of agreement between the studies. Two cases where the con-
clusions differed were for the chains A/P and A/¬C. In both cases,
the participants in our study strongly preferred PREVENT con-
clusions, as opposed to ALLOW¬ conclusions in Goldvarg and
Johnson-Laird (2001). Another case where the conclusions in
the two studies differed was for the chain ¬C/A. In our study,
participants’ most frequent conclusion was ¬CAUSE (i.e., ¬A
causes C), whereas in Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird (2001), it
was ¬ALLOW (i.e., ¬A allows C). However, as shown in Table 8,
6The percentages in Tables 8–10 do not always sum to 100% because partic-
ipants sometimes indicated that no conclusion followed (Experiment 2) or
chose “none of the above” (Experiments 3 and 4).
Table 8 | Experiment 2 results and predictions by composition and theory.
Composition C/C C/A C/P C/¬C A/C A/A A/P A/¬C
Mental model theory C A P P A A *A¬ *A¬
Causal model theory C A P P A A P P
Force theory C A (76%) C (24%) P P A (76%) C (24%) A P P
Observed responses C (85%) A (95) P (100%) P (95%) A (65%) A (95%) P (80%) P (70%)
C (5%) C (35%) A¬ (0%) A¬ (0%)
Composition P/C P/A P/P P/¬C ¬C/C ¬C/A ¬C/P ¬C/¬C
Mental model theory P P P C ¬C *¬A ¬P ¬P
Causal model theory P P *A (50%) C (50%) C (50%) A (50%) ¬C *¬A ¬P ¬P
Force theory P P *A (62%) C (38%) C (49%) A (22%) ¬C (50%) ¬A (43%) *¬A (90%) ¬C (9%) ¬P (51%) ¬P (20%)
Observed responses P (75%) P (80%) P (65%) C (60%) ¬C (90%) ¬C (50%) ¬P (90%) ¬P (45%)
A (20%) A (15%) ¬A (0%) ¬A (40%) C (15%)
C (15%) P (15%)
C, “Cause”; A, “Allow,” P, “Prevent”; ¬C, e.g., “Not A cause B”; C¬ = e.g., “A cause not C”; *missed prediction, Observed responses in bold, conclusions that
were predicted by one of the theories.
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the percentage of ¬CAUSE, 50%, was only slightly higher than
that for ¬ALLOW, 40%, so the results observed here do not dif-
fer radically from those observed in Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird
(2001).
The mental model theory correctly predicted 13 of the 16
compositions, a result that was significantly greater than chance
by a binomial test, p < 0.05. The causal model theory and
the force theory correctly predicted 14 of the 16 composi-
tions, a result that also differed from chance by a binomial test,
p< 0.01.
It needs to be acknowledged that for two of the relation
compositions, ¬C/P and ¬C/¬C, the force theory predicted the
modal response, but at a different level of acceptability than what
was observed. For example, for ¬C/P, the force theory predicted
that people would produce¬P at a level of 51%;¬P was the dom-
inant response, but at a level of 90%. This difference in level of
acceptability predicted by the theory and actual responding need
not be interpreted as a problem for the force theory. It is quite
possible that in cases like ¬C/P, people were not happy with their
conclusion, but they went with it anyway because they could not
think of another possible response and they did not want to leave
the question unanswered.
One prediction that was missed by both the force theory and
the causal model was that associated with the chain P/P. In both
Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird and in this experiment, the modal
response was PREVENT, whereas in Experiment 1a, based on
visual materials, the model responses were ALLOW and CAUSE.
As already discussed, the force and causal model theories pre-
dict ALLOW and CAUSE conclusions. As mentioned earlier, one
reason why people may have reached a PREVENT conclusion to
chains containing two PREVENTs is because of an atmosphere
effect: with two PREVENT relations in the premises, partici-
pants may have been biased to report PREVENT conclusions. The
potential impact of atmosphere might be especially salient when
people do not fully understand the nature of the PREVENT rela-
tions in the premises, which is exactly what might be expected
given the nature of the materials used in this experiment. As dis-
cussed earlier, the materials used vague psychological terms that
could be combined in different ways while still sounding plau-
sible. These materials were used to minimize the influence of
prior knowledge, but because they were not based on real causal
relations, participants may have done less well in instantiating
the underlying representations, which may have partially com-
promised the composition process, making it more vulnerable
to atmosphere effects. Our speculation is supported by recent
findings that people are more likely to generate CAUSE and
ALLOW conclusions to double preventions when the conclu-
sions are supported by prior knowledge (Chaigneau and Barbey,
2008) than when they are not supported by prior knowledge.
This finding is consistent with the well-known phenomenon
that performance on reasoning problems often improves when
participants are given “concrete” or “realistic” content in the
task (Wason and Shapiro, 1971; Johnson-Laird et al., 1972;
Almor and Sloman, 2000; see Eysenck and Keane, 2000 for a
review). The potential benefits of computing causal composi-
tions from known causal relations were examined in the next
experiment.
EXPERIMENT 3
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to once again examine the
ability of the three models to predict the conclusions that fol-
lowed from the composition of relatively abstract causal relations.
As in Experiment 2, participants drew conclusions from a set of
two-premise problems. However, in this experiment, the premises
were based on actual causal relationships found in text that could
be accessed via the internet. By using such materials, we could
investigate the ability of the models to account for complex real
world causal relations. Some of the causal relations described
physical processes, but the majority of the causal relations were
quite abstract (e.g., Economic freedom causes wealth). A second
difference between the current experiment and Experiment 2
is that in the current experiment the number of chain types
was doubled. One final difference between the current experi-
ment and Experiment 2 was in the use of a different dependent
measure. Instead of having people type out responses, partici-
pants selected from a list of possible responses, such as CAUSE,
ALLOW, PREVENT, ¬A_CAUSE, etc. One of the advantages
to using a multiple-choice dependent measure is that it high-
lighted for the participants the full range of possible conclusions
that could be derived. A second advantage was that it poten-
tially encouraged participants to spend more time thinking about
the conclusions than typing out a response. Minimizing the
time requirements of the experiment was important since there
were 6 times as many trials in the current experiment than in
Experiment 2.
Methods
Participants. The participants were 40 Emory University under-
graduates who took part in the study for course credit.
Participants in the current study did not participate in any of the
other experiments described in this paper. All participants were
native speakers of English.
Materials. For each of the 32 causal compositions listed in
Table 8, we found six real-world examples for a total of 192 causal
chains (see Table A3 in the Appendix). All of the premises used
in these chains were found on the internet using the Google and
Yahoo search engines7 .
7Finding an example typically began with typing in a causal verb, sometimes
with a negation, such as cause, allow, prevent, lack of causes, absence of causes,
causes lack of, and then looking for results with an A-cause-verb-B structure.
We sought examples in which the A and B terms consisted of only one or two
words. Sometimes it was possible to shorten longer phrases into one or two
words. For example, the sentence Scanning probe microscopes allow observa-
tion of insulating organic materials was re-written as simply Microscopes allow
observation. In effect, the process of sampling the A and B arguments involved
finding the “head” noun of the A and B term phrases, that is, the main noun
that is modified by other elements in a noun phrase (Radford, 1988). Once a
possible premise was identified, we searched for a second premise that could
be linked to it. For example, given the premise Microscopes allow observation,
we looked for phrases containing a causal verb, either with or without nega-
tion, that either ended with microscopes or began with observation. We used
search terms such as cause microscopes, allows microscopes, observation causes,
observation allows, etc. As with the initial premise, the arguments in the second
premise sometimes needed to be reduced to their head nouns.
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Procedure. Participants were run on windows-based computers
in sound-attenuating carrels using E-Prime (version 2.0) by
Psychology Software tools. Participants were told that the exper-
iment concerned how people reason on the basis of causal
knowledge. They were told that they would be presented with
reasoning problems that consisted of two statements such as
Smoking causes cancer, Cancer causes health problems. Each pair
of premises was followed by the question “What, if anything, fol-
lows?” For each pair of premises, participants chose from a list
of ten possible responses including nine conclusions (CAUSE,
ALLOW, PREVENT, ¬A_CAUSE, ¬A_ALLOW, ¬A_PREVENT,
CAUSE¬, ALLOW¬, PREVENT¬) and “none of the above.” The
list of possible responses was changed to fit the content of each
particular composition. For example, for the premises Sanding
wood causes dust,Dust prevents good adhesion, the possible conclu-
sions included Sanding causes good adhesion, Sanding allows good
adhesion, Sanding prevents good adhesion, Lack of sanding causes
good adhesion, Lack of sanding allows good adhesion, and so on.
Participants were told to assume that the premises were true and
that they should select the conclusion that best followed from the
premises. Pairs of premises were presented, one at a time, in a
different random order for each participant.
Design.Participants were randomly assigned to one of two list ver-
sions. In each, participants made judgments on one half of the
materials, which included three examples each of the 32 possible
causal chains, for a total of 96 chains.
Results and Discussion
The results provided stronger support for the force theory and the
causal model theories over the mental models theory. The use of
real-world materials led to an improvement in the already high fit
to the data provided by the force theory and causal model the-
ory. Table 9 lists (in bold) the percentage of times that people
chose one of the types of conclusions predicted by at least one
of the theories. The mental model theory correctly predicted the
most frequent response on 26 of the 32 possible compositions,
a result that was significantly greater than chance by a binomial
test, p< 0.001. The force theory and the causal model theory cor-
rectly predicted 30 of the 32 possible compositions, which was
also significant by a binomial test, p < 0.000001. The Friedman
test indicated that the number of correct predictions made by the
force theory and the causal model theory was greater than the
number of correct predictions made by the mental model theory,
χ2(2) = 8.00, p = 0.018.
The two chains that were missed by the force theory, ¬C¬/A
and ¬C¬/P, were also missed by the causal model theory and
the mental model theory. The reason why the theories failed to
correctly predict these two compositions can be explained by
our adoption of the matching processing assumption. As dis-
cussed earlier, we assumed that people’s conclusions would be
expressed in a manner similar to the way they were expressed in
the premises. For example, if the first premise was given in terms
of an absence, we assumed that people would express the conclu-
sion in terms of an absence. In contrast to this assumption, the
modal response to ¬C¬/A was ALLOW, rather than ¬PREVENT,
as predicted by all three theories. As it turns out, in all three
theories, ¬PREVENT compositions can also be expressed as
ALLOW relations8. In the case of ¬C¬/P, the modal response was
PREVENT, instead of ¬ALLOW as predicted by the force theory,
or ¬CAUSE as predicted by the causal model and model theories.
As it turns out, the force theory predicts that ¬ALLOW implies
PREVENT 100% of the time, and the causal model theory pre-
dicts that ¬CAUSE can be re-described as PREVENT. In other
words, the mismatch between the predictions of the theories and
participants’ responses was due to our assumption that partici-
pants would describe the conclusions in a manner that matched
the premises. If we allow paraphrases of the predicted conclu-
sions, the force theory, and perhaps the causal model theory, are
able to predict the responses to all 32 chains.
One particularly important finding in this experiment was
with respect to P/P chains. Consistent with Experiment 1a, the
most frequently derived conclusion for these chains was ALLOW,
not PREVENT. As noted earlier, it has been argued that double
preventions should lead to either ALLOW or CAUSE conclusions
(Foot, 1967; McMahan, 1993; McGrath, 2003). The current find-
ings, based on real-world causal relations, provide support for this
claim.
The results from this experiment suggest that an approach to
relation composition based on iconic codes is as good as the causal
model theory and better than the mental model theory in being
about to predict abstract causal compositions. The force theory’s
ability to account for causal reasoning was strengthened when the
underlying causal relations were based on causal relations with
real world correlates, as used in Experiment 2.
In experiments reported so far, the relation compositions
involved only two relations. However, all of the theories allow
for relation compositions involving three or more relations. In
the case of the mental model theory, the composition of C/A/C
might begin with the derivation of a conclusion between the
first two relations, C and A (leading to an ALLOW conclusion),
which could then be composed with the next relation, CAUSE,
to yield the overall conclusion ALLOW. As discussed in Sloman
et al. (2009), in the causal model theory, the process of substitu-
tion can be extended to three-premise compositions and beyond.
Finally, in the case of the force theory, adding additional relations
simply involves adding together more patient vectors in the con-
clusion. In the next experiment, we examined the ability of the
three models to account for relation compositions involving 3
relations.
EXPERIMENT 4
As in Experiment 4, the materials were based on real-world
causal statements obtained from the internet. However, in this
experiment, the chains were based on three relations instead
of two.
Methods
Participants. The participants were 24 Emory University under-
graduates who took part in the study for course credit.
8For ¬C¬/A, the causal model theory implies C:= ∼(∼A) and X, which is
equivalent to¬PREVENT (Sloman et al., 2009); however the composition can
also be re-described as C:= A and X, which maps onto ALLOW.
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Participants in the current study did not participate in any of the
other experiments described in this paper. All participants were
native speakers of English.
Materials. The materials were based on the 25 causal chains listed
in Table 10. We found four real-world examples for each of these
Compositions for a total of 100 causal chains (see Table A4 in
Appendix A in the Supplementary Materials). As in Experiment
3, all of the premises used in these compositions were found on
the internet using the Google and Yahoo search engines.
Procedure and Design. The procedure was essentially the same
as in Experiment 3, except that participants were presented with
three connected premises instead of two. For example, people saw
statements like Factories cause pollution. Pollution causes global
warming. Global warming prevents snow fall. Below each triplet
were ten possible responses including nine conclusions (e.g.,
Factories cause snow fall, Factories allow snow fall, Factories pre-
vent snow fall, Lack of factories cause snow fall, Lack of factories
allow snow fall, Lack of factories prevent snow fall, Factories cause
lack of snow fall, Factories allow lack of snow fall, Factories prevent
lack of snow fall) and None of the above. Participants were told to
assume that the premises were true and that they should select the
conclusion that best followed from the premises. Pairs of premises
were presented, one at a time, in a different random order for each
participant. The list of causal chains was divided in half, with each
list containing two examples of each type of causal chain. Half of
the participants saw one list and the remaining participants saw
the other list.
Results and Discussion
The results provided further evidence that people may reason
about causal chains using iconic codes, even when the component
causal relations are complex and abstract. The results are shown
Table 10 | Experiment 4 results and predictions by causal chain and theory.
A/C/C C/A/C C/C/A A/C¬/C¬ C¬/A/C¬ C¬/C¬/A C/C/C
Mental model theory A A A A *C¬ *P C
Causal model theory A A A A *¬P A C
Force theory A (62%) C (38%) A (65%) C (35%) A (69%) C (31%) A (95%) C (5%) A (52%) C (48%) A (93%) C (7%) C
Observed responses A (54%) A (58%) A (71%) A (42%) A (25%) A (63%) C (77%)
C (38%) C (27%) C (23%) C (19%) C (21%) C (17%)
¬P (15%) P (2%)
C¬ (8%)
C/C¬/C¬ C¬/C/C¬ C¬/C¬/C C¬/C/C C/C¬/C C/C/C¬
Mental model theory *P *P *P P P C¬
Causal model theory C *C C P P C¬
Force theory C (61%) A (39%) *C (60%) A (40%) C (65%) A (10%) P P C¬
Observed responses C (33%) C (18%) C (42%) P (46%) P (42%) C¬ (60%)
A (31%) A (13%) A (23%) C¬ (29%) C¬ (29%) P (25%)
P¬ (8) P¬ (27) P (13%)
C/P/P P/C/P P/P/C P/C/C C/P/C C/C/P
Mental model theory P P P P P P
Causal model theory C (50) A (50) C (50) A (50) C (50) A (50) P P P
Force theory C (61%) A (39%) A (64) C (37) C (49) A (22) P P P
Observed responses C (35) A (38) C (42) P (83) P (56) P (73)
A (25) C (4) A (33)
P (25) P (6) P (4)
Pn (21)
A/P/P P/A/P P/P/A C/P/¬C P/C/¬C C/¬C/P
Mental model theory P P P C C A
Causal model theory A A A C (50) A (50) C (50) A (50) C (50) A (50)
Force theory A (94) C (5) A (52%) C (48%) A (92) C (7) C (54) A (9) C (60) A (22) *C (60) A (40)
A (63) A (42) A (60) C (60) C (44) A (42)
C (0) C (21) C (0) A (19) A (21) C (19)
P (8) P (13) P (6) P (2) P (4) P (23)
C, “Cause,” A, “Allow”; P, “Prevent”; ¬C, e.g., “Not A cause B”; C¬ = e.g., “A cause not C”; *missed prediction; Observed responses in bold, conclusions that
were predicted by one of the theories.
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in Table 10, which lists (in bold) the percentage of times that peo-
ple chose one of the types of conclusions predicted by at least one
of the theories.
The mental model theory correctly predicted the most fre-
quent response in 14 of the 25 possible compositions, a result
that did not differ from chance by a binomial test, p = 0.69. The
force theory and the causal model theory correctly predicted 23 of
the 25 possible compositions, a result that differed from chance
by a binomial test, p < 0.001. The Friedman test indicated that
the number of correct predictions made by the force theory and
the causal model theory was greater than the number of correct
predictions made by the mental model theory, χ2(2) = 18.00, p <
0.001.
One chain that was missed by all three theories was C¬/C/C¬.
Themental model theory predicts that themodal response should
be PREVENT while the causal model and the force theory pre-
dict that it should be CAUSE. The actual modal response was
PREVENT¬. As it turns out, both the causal model and force
theory predict that PREVENT¬ is related to CAUSE (because
PREVENT¬ is a way of expressing a double prevention), so
PREVENT¬ conclusions were not at all inconsistent with these
theories.
One chain that both the mental model and the causal model
theory missed was C¬/A/C¬. The mental model theory predicted
CAUSE¬ and the causal model theory predicted ¬PREVENT,
whereas the actual modal response was ALLOW. As described
in Sloman et al. (2009), C¬/A/C¬ implies D:= ∼(∼A and X),
which cannot be re-described as D:= A and X, and hence the
conclusion ¬PREVENT cannot be re-expressed as ALLOW.
The second chain missed by the force theory was C/¬C/P.
The force theory predicted the conclusions CAUSE (60%) and
ALLOW (40%) while the observed conclusions were ALLOW
(42%) and CAUSE (19%). The causal model theory also pre-
dicted CAUSE and ALLOW, but not which conclusion should
occur more frequently. As it turns out, of the six cases for which
the causal model theory predicted both CAUSE and ALLOW,
the C/¬C/P chain was the only chain for which the force theory
did predict the most frequent conclusion. Indeed, given that the
causal model theory does not specify which conclusion should be
more frequent in chains where both CAUSE and ALLOW con-
clusions are predicted, it could be argued that the causal model
theory only correctly predicted 18 of the 25 modal responses, in
contrast to the force theory’s 23 out of 25. In sum, the results
indicate that the force theory provides at least as good account
of people’s causal compositions as the causal model theory, and a
better account than the mental model theory.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this paper we investigated three accounts of causal composi-
tion. One of the main questions addressed in this research was
whether generative causal reasoning could be accomplished in
terms of iconic mental codes, or whether such reasoning neces-
sarily involved the use of abstract mental codes. The results from
Experiment 1 provide strong support for the force theory over the
causal model and mental model theories. All of the theories did
a good job of predicting how the causal chains would be com-
posed, but only the force theory was able to be able to predict
how such chains might be instantiated in the physical world.
This is important because the ability to predict how the chains
might be instantiated in the world can be reversed to explain how
such events might be perceived. In the other theories, additional
machinery must be formulated to explain how the representa-
tions used in these theories are related to perceptual experience.
The remaining experiments examined whether reasoning on the
basis of iconic representations could account for the way people
compose abstract causal relations. The results in Experiment 2
showed that reasoning on the basis of iconic representations could
account for relation composition just as well as reasoning on the
basis of abstract representations. The results from Experiments
3, 4 showed that when the relations being composed were asso-
ciated with actual causal relations, an account based on iconic
mental codes was able to explain the data as well as or better than
accounts based on abstract mental codes.
SIGNIFICANCE OF CAUSAL COMPOSITION
Theories of relation composition allows us to address a number
of theoretical challenges in the causal representation and reason-
ing literatures. For one, theories of relation composition help
explain why causal relations sometimes require spatial and tem-
poral contiguity, while other times they do not (Einhorn and
Hogarth, 1986). The importance of spatial and temporal contigu-
ity has been repeatedly observed in standard “billiard ball” type
events in which one object hits and launches another into motion
(Michotte, 1946/1963; Leslie, 1984; for a review, see Scholl and
Tremoulet, 2000; Hubbard, 2013a,b). But clearly, in other sce-
narios, spatial-temporal contiguity is not needed. To borrow an
example from Davidson (2001, p. 177), putting poison in the
water tank of a spaceship while it is still on earth constitutes mur-
der even if the astronauts do not drink the water and die until
they reach Mars. Relation composition offers a way to address
this non-contiguity: when a causal relation consists of a sin-
gle relation, spatial-temporal contiguity is necessary, but when a
causal relation is derived from the composition of causal relations,
spatial-temporal contiguity is not necessary (Wolff, 2007).
Another phenomenon that theories of relation composition
help us to explain is the hierarchical structure of causal knowl-
edge. The process of relation composition results in an over-
arching causal relation. This summary relation can then serve as
a component in another causal chain, which, in turn, might be
chunked into an even more abstract causal relation (Keil, 2006;
Walsh and Sloman, 2011).
Yet another reason why causal relation composition may be
essential to our understanding of causal knowledge is that it may
support a special kind of causal learning. Consider, for exam-
ple, how people might learn the causal relation overgrazing causes
desertification. At first, overgrazing causes the lack of vegeta-
tion. Once the vegetation is removed, the dry unprotected soil is
blown away by the wind or washed away by water, leaving the
lower, infertile soil that prevents the re-establishment of plants.
Eventually, the dry rocky soil forms dunes (Wilson, 2002). The
causal relationship between overgrazing and desertification was
probably not learned by directly observing a statistical depen-
dency between overgrazing and desertification; the time periods
involved are too long. Instead, such relations are probably learned
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though the composition of simple causal relations into more
complex causal relations. When people acquire causal relations
from the composition of relations, it illustrates learning by rea-
soning (Barbey andWolff, 2007). Learning by reasoning allows for
the online construction of causal structures from various snippets
of causal knowledge (di Sessa, 1993; Barsalou, 1999; Keil, 2006).
CONCLUSION
Much of the recent research on causal cognition has been domi-
nated by theories of causation that assume non-iconic represen-
tations. The emphasis is quite understandable since such theories
have been able to address in a rigorous fashion some of the most
interesting aspects of causal cognition, in particular, the prob-
lems of how people put causal relationships together into larger
structures and then reason over those structures. The force the-
ory represents the first iconic-based theory to address these more
demanding problems. The results from this paper show that a
process approach is not only able to address these kinds of prob-
lems, but may also offer a stronger fit to the data than accounts
based on abstract representations, demonstrating how the units of
cognition that are generated from perceptual processes may enter
directly into higher-order reasoning.
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